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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ~ 
vs. I 11004 
AGOBERTO GARCIA JASSO, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a prosecution for unlawful possession of a 
marijuana. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
A Motion to Suppress was brought by the Def end-
a11t and was denied. The case was tried to the Court. 
From a judgment of guilty, Defendant appeals. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Order denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and reversal of the 
conviction. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS* 
The evidence of possession of marijuana that was 
used as the basis of the conviction of the Defendant 
was obtained through a search of the Defendant's home. 
The search was made under the authority of a Search 
Warrant signed by Judge Glenn J. _Mecham of the 
Ogden City Court (RI-B). The Search '\Tarrant was 
issued at the request of Sergeant Hal R. Adair of the 
Ogden City Police Department, who had pre-prepared 
an Affidavit for Search and Seizure Warrant and a 
Search and Seizure Warrant (T 14) and taken them 
to the Judge's home late at night. Sergeant Adair 
swore to the Affidavit (T.P.H. 4) which stated, 
(RI-A), "And that the facts tending to establish the 
foregoing grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are as follows: Based on information immediately af-
forded me, I have probable cause to believe that mari-
* R means Record on Appeal 
T. means Transcript of Trial 
T.P.H. means Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
T.A. means Transcript of proceeding of February 
27, 1967, filed as additional record on appeal. 
T.B. means Transcript of proceedings of March 6. 
1967, filed as additional record on appeal. 
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juana is presently being concealed at the residence of 
Agolberto J. Garcia at 660 23rd Street, Ogden, Utah." 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence so ob-
tained ( R 4). At the conclusion of the argument on the 
motion, Judge Wahlquist ruled (T.A. l, 2) that under 
the law of the State of Utah the Affidavit filed was 
insufficient to support a valid Search Warrant, but 
allowed the prosecution one week to file an Amended 
Affidavit. An Amended Affidavit was filed (R 8) and 
the Court thereupon ruled that the deficiencies of the 
original Affidavit were cured and denied the motion. 
(T.B. l, 2). At the trial the Court made the same 
ruling ( T. 18, 19 ) and over the objection of the De-
fendant allowed the fruits of the search to be admitted 
as eYidence. ( T 19). Judge 'Vahlquist found the De-
fendant guilty and sentenced him to serve a term in the 
state penitentiary (R 17). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE THE AFFIDAVIT ON WHICH 
THE SEARCH \V ARRANT 'VAS BASED DID 
NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
PROBABLE CAUSE, THE SEARCH WAR-
RANT 'VAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED AND 
VOID. 
The Constitution of the Utate of Utah, Article I, 
Seetion 14 and the Federal Constitution Amendment 
' 
3 
4, are word for word identical and each forbids the 
issuance of search warrants except on probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation. Each states: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized." 
The statutes of the State of Utah set out the man-
ner and method of issuing Search Warrants in order 
to conform with the constitutional mandates. 77-54-3 
U.C.A. 1953, is a rephrasing of a portion of the Con· 
stitution and makes a finding of probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation a condition precedent to 
the issuance of a warrant. 
77-54-4 U.C.A. 1953, requires an examination on 
oath of the complainant, the taking of a written depo-
sition, and the susbscribing thereof. As a matter of 
practice, this section is usually conformed to by the 
swearing to and subscribing of a written Affidavit. 
77-54-5 U.C.A. 1953, is a requirement that the 
deposition (Affidavit) must set forth the facts estab-
lishing probable cause. 
77-54-6 U.C.A. 1953, requires a finding by the 
magistrate of the existence of probable cause after fol-
lowing the steps as set out in the previous sections. 
The Affidavit (R-lA) which was subscribed and 
sworn to before Judge .Mecham at the time the Search 
4 
Warrant was issued was made by Sergeant Hal R . 
. \clair of the Ogden City Police Department. It is a 
form Affidavit developed by Sergeant Adair himself, 
to be used in obtaining Search 'V arrants. ( T 15). The 
Affidavit states: 
"The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes 
and says: That he has probable cause to believe ,, 
and at the bottom of the Affidavit where the form calls 
for facts tending to establish grounds for issuance of 
a Search Warrant, is typed: 
"Based on information immediately afforded 
me, I have probable cause to believe that mari-
juana is presently being concealed at the resi-
dence of Agoberto J. Garcia at 660 23rd Street, 
Ogden, Utah." 
This is the only Affidavit subscribed to under oath at 
any time before Judge Mecham, the issuing magistrate. 
(T 6, 7) (T.P.H. 14). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously been 
presented with the question of the legality of a Search 
\V arrant and the 'V arrant' s supporting Affidavit. In 
the case of Allen vs. Lindbeck, Justice of the Peace, 
ct al., 97 Utah 471, 83 P2d 920, decided September 20, 
rn:rn, a definition of probable cause is given on page 477 
to he: 
"Such an apparent state of facts that a dis-
crete and prudent man would be led to belief 
that the accused at the time of the application 
for a 'V arrant was in possession of property 
sought to be seized." 
5 
and rejected a statutory requirement requiring merely 
that the Affiant have reason to believe and does believe. 
In deciding Allen vs. Lindbeck, this Court analyzed 
an extended series of annotations and case law in align-
ing itself with the overwhelming weight of authority 
which requires that the Affidavit must state the facts 
showing the grounds for probable cause. The case spe· 
cifically cites and adopts State vs. Arrequi, 44 Idaho 43, 
254 P 788, 52 A.L.R. 463, and the Idaho court's sum-
marization of its examination of numerous authorities 
wherein it states: 
"Under the great weight of authority of both 
state and federal courts, a Search Warrant issued 
upon informtaion and belief unsupported by 
facts submitted to the magistrate and based 
upon the conclusion of the AffianJ rather than 
the facts, is illegal and a search conducted there 
is unlawful and in violation of the constitutional 
provision with relation to searches and seizures.' 
In Allen vs. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P2d 242, 
it was contended by Appellant (page 324) : 
"That the Affidavit upon which the Search 
Warrant was issued was insufficient-that prob· 
able cause did not exist-and that the Search 
Warrant was illegel and void and the search 
conducted in pursuance thereof, wrongful and 
unlawful and violated the rights of the Plain· 
tiff." 
In sustaining the Appellant's contention, the Court 
analyzed the Affidavit filed to see if the Affidavit was 
sufficient to give probable cause. This analysis is done 
6 
under what was then Section 105-54-3 R.S.U. 1933, 
and is now 77-54-3 U .C.A. 1953, and Article I, Section 
U, of the Constitution of the State of Utah, stating on 
page 330: 
"Under the case of Allen vs. Lindbeck, Justice 
of the Peace, et al. above, it was held that the 
Affidavit must set forth facts sufficient to cause 
a discrete and prudent man to believe that the 
accused had the property sought to be seized. 
The fact that the Affiant says that he has that 
belief in and of itself is not sufficient to make 
probable cause." 
The Court concludes that the Affidavit is nothing but 
mere conclusions of the Affiant, there being (page 
331) : 
"No facts being set forth upon which a Com-
plaint for perjury could be predicated if falsely 
. " given. 
j[len vs. H olurook therefore establishes the rule that 
the Affidavit must set out sufficient facts upon which 
a Complaint for perjury could be predicated if falsely 
given. 
A further annotation covering this exact point, 
i.e., the sufficiency of Affidavit for Search Warrant, 
based upon Affiant' s belief, based in turn on informa-
toin, investigation, etc., by one whose name is not dis-
close<l, is found in 14 A.L.R. 2nd, page 605, following 
a reporting of the case of DeLacy vs. City of Miami, 
hegiuning on page 602, and gives numerous examples of 
particular allegations or recitals of Affidavits ruled 
insufficient by courts of various states. 
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Justice Goldberg, in United States vs. Ventresca, 
(1965) 13 L Ed 2d 684, stated on page 689: 
"This is not to say that probable cause can be 
made out by Affidavits which are purely con-
clus.ory, stating only the affiant's or informer's 
belief that probable cause exists without detailing 
any of the "underlying" circumstances upon 
which that belief is based. See Aguilar vs. Texas, 
supra. Recitals of some of the underlying cir-
cumstances in the Affidavit is essential if the 
Magistrate is to perform his detached function 
and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the 
police." 
The Affidavit in question here states no facts what· 
soever, but only that Affiant has information that gives 
him probable cause to believe. Applying the test of 
"probable cause" as set out in Allen vs. Lindbeck, 
supra, this Affidavit is insufficient to support a Search 
Warrant, as it sets out no facts whereby a discreet and 
prudent man would be led to the belief that the accused 
at the time of the application for a Warrant was in 
possession of property sought to be seized. 
In applying the test of Allen vs. Holbrook, (supra), 
this Affidavit sets out no facts upon which a Complaint 
for perjury could be predicated. The Search Warrant 
itself (R-lB) states on its face that it is based on proof 
that Sergeant Adair has probable cause to believe, and 
does not state that the magistrate has made a finding 
of probable cause. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE 
THE POWER TO ORDER THE FILING OF 
AN A.MENDED AFFIDAVIT IN ORDER TO 
l\IAKE A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS 
ILLEGAL AND VOID UPON ISSUANCE A 
'rALID SEARCH WARRANT. 
At the conclusion of the argument of Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on the 27th of February, 1967, 
Judge Wahlquist ruled (T.A. 1, 2) that the Affidavit 
sworn to and filed at the time of the issuance of the 
Search Warrant was insufficient and on the basis of 
that Affidavit a Motion to Suppress will lie. Then, 
howeYer, he granted the prosecution one week to file 
an Amended Affidavit to allow what he termed the 
writing out of a true summary of what took place and 
to correct a clerical error. An Amended Affidavit 
(R-8) was filed under date of March 2, 1967, using 
the Court and cause of the action in the District Court 
of 'Veber County, Utah, and sworn to before a notary 
public by Sergeant Adair. 
After filing an Amended Affidavit, Judge Wahl-
quist ruled on March 6, 1967, (T.B. 1, 2) that this 
Amended Affidavit cured the "technical" error. He 
stated (T.B. 1): 
"The Court interprets the law to require that 
the macristrate must make the basic decision him-
self. H~wever, the Court also following the ma-
jority rule, and also a Utah rule that a judge 
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may act on hearsay, the Court does believe that 
if the information that is now in the Affidavit 
was given to a judge and he duly transcribed it. 
it undoubtedly would result in a valid warrant. 
The Court does believe that the only deficiency 
actually existing here was the failure of the Cit). 
Judge to transcribe it and put it into writing 
before he actually signed the \Varrant." 
On the point of the Court's authority to allow 
such amendment, I could find no cases where such an 
act had even been attempted. The cases all analyze tlie 
Affidavit filed at the time of the issuance of the 'Var-
rant, as this Court did in the well-reasoned cases of 
Allen vs. Lindbeck and Allen vs. Holbrook, (supra). 
The rule as stated in 79 CJS 866, is: 
"Constitutional or statutory provisions re-
quiring that probable cause for the issuance of 
a Search \Varrant be shown by sworn statements 
in writing are mandatory and must be complied 
with, and, hence, where such a statute is in force, 
a warrant issued on oral information is void. 
Moreover, where, as in the case in some of these 
jurisdictions, the statute requires the issuing 
officer to examine, on oath, affiant and any wit-
nesses he may produce, in order to inquire into 
the truth of the Affidavit offered, this provision 
is likewise mandatory and must be complied 
with, and such officer is required to take their 
Affidavits or depositions in writing."' 
Utah, by statute, has established a very set method 
to be followed in the issuing of Search Warr ants. 
77-54-3 U.C.A. 1953 Conditions precedent. 
- A Search 'Varrant shall not issue except upou 
probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
10 
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tion, particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
77-54-4 U.C.A. 1953 Examination of com-
plainant and witnesses. - The magistrate must, 
before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the 
complainant, and any witnesses he may produce, 
and take their depositions in writing, and cause 
them to be subscribed by the parties making them. 
77-54-5 Depositions, what to contain. - The 
depositions must set forth the facts tending to 
establish the grounds of the application, or 
probable cause for believing that they exist. 
It is to be noted that Sections 77-54-4, U.C.A. 1953, 
and 77-54-5, U.C.A. 1953, each uses the word "must", 
therefore making such requirement mandatory. 
Judge "\V ahlquist' s ruling is apparently based 
upon the evidence given at the preliminary hearing by 
Sergeant Adair and Judge Mecham to the effect that 
additional information was told to Judge Mecham prior 
to the swearing of the Affidavit. However, admittedly, 
none of the additional information was given ·by reason 
of an examination under oath as required by 77-54-3 
U.C.A. 1953 and 77-54-4 U.C.A. 1953. 
Sergeant Adair testified (T.P.H. 4): 
"I typed up this Affidavit and took it up to 
the Judge's house where I informed him of the 
previous buys and everything and swore to this 
and signed it in his presence." 
Judge Mecham testified (T.P.H. 11): 
"We coronented on the abbreviated form of 
the Affidavit. It was because of the brevity of 
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the Affidavit that I swore Officer Adair awl 
there was only one oath administered that I m 
eluded in the oath the statements by the Officer 
which he affirmed relative to the ·truthfullness 
of his oath representations. In effect, I admin-
istered the oath, 'You do solemnly swear that the 
representations made here to me relative to the 
Affidavit and oral, and the allegations in the 
Affidavit are true and correct to the best of your 
knowledge, information and belief, so help you 
God?, and his answer was, 'I do,' or an affirma-
tion of that nature." 
That was the only oath given, the intent being to give it 
retrospective effect (T.P.H. 12). There was no oath 
administered that the Affiant would respond to an ex-
amination (T.P.H. 13), and the only information 
reduced to writing was the Affidavit in question, then 
being no separate written depositions ( T.P.H. 14). 
No other Affidavit from Sergeant Adair or any other 
person was submitted t o Judge :Mecham at the time of 
the obtaining of the Search 'Varrant ( T. 6, 7). 
Defendant duly objected to the admission of the 
evidence ( T 5, 7) , and to the admission of oral evi-
dence not conforming to the statute mandate (T 8) 
and to the filing of th Amended Affidavit (T 10) 
and to the Amended Affidavit itself ( T 13, 14), and 
to the admission of the fruits of the search ( T 5, 17 I· 
All of the Defendant's objections were overruled. 
In making his ruling in allowing the evidence of 
the fruits of the search ( T 18, 19) after giving a fair I) 
good statement as to why ·we have constitutional and 
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<l statutory provisions for the protection of the population, 
1 the Judge stated that: 
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"The Court believes that the provisions of the 
testimony given must be under oath and also 
must be in writing as required by statute and is 
mandatory." 
llut that corrected Affidavits could be filed to correct 
defects in the issuance of the Search 'V arrant which 
are clerical rather than substantive. In so ruling, the 
Court stated (T 18): 
"The Court believes that the prov1s10ns that 
the right basis of the act shall be placed in writ-
ing is made to protect unfounded and careless 
issuance of Search Warrants and also, make it 
possible to ascertain at a later date, exact data 
on which basis it is issued and also for the person 
may either accept or deny a compliance with 
a Search 'V arrant when it is presented to him. 
In this case, I have no evidence of either accept-
ance or denial of the Search 'Varrant of the per-
son that it is pr~sented to." 
The inference being that if the Defendant had forcibly 
resisted the officers making the search, perhaps the 
.Judge's decision would have been different; a position 
that can have no basis in law. 
POINT Ill 
SINCE THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS 
('0NDTTCTED UNDER A 'VARRANT IL-
LEGALLY ISSUED AND VOID, IT IS UN-
13 
LA,VFUL AND UNREASONABLE AND h\'1-
DENCE OBTAINED THEREUNDER IS IN-
ADMISSIBLE. 
In Allen vs. Lindbeck, (supra) the Court quotes 
from and adopts the language of State vs. Arreyui, 
44 Idaho 43, 254 P 788, 794, 52 A.L.R. 463, 473, where-
in the Idaho Court summarized its examination of 
numerous authorities. 
State vs. Arrequi is the subject case of the an-
notation of 52 A.L.R. 463. It is a well-reasoned case 
wherein the Idaho Court sided with those states who 
held that evidence obtained in violation of the lJ.S. 
Constitution Amendment 4 and the Idaho Constitution 
was inadmissible as constituting a violation of e.s. 
Constitution Amendment 5. 
Mapp vs. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643, L.Ed 2 1081, 81 ' 
S Ct 1684, 84 A.L.R. 2d 933, decided June 19, 1961, 
has ruled that all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the 4th Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution is by virtue of the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment, guaranteeing the right 
to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, in-
admissible in a state court. Hence the division between 
the states in regard to the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by unlawful search and seizure is abolished 
with all states now excluding unconstitutional evidence, 
In the case of Aguilar vs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 
decided June 15, 1964, the Court analyzed an AtfidaYil 
which in relevant part recited that (page 109), 
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"Affiants have received reliable information 
from a credible person and do believe that heroin, 
marijuana, barbituates, and other narcotics and 
narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the 
above described premises for the purpose of sale 
and use contrary to the provisions of law." 
The Court analyzed the status of the law in regard to 
Search \Varrants under the 4th and 14th Amendments, 
and particularly the Affidavit as set out above, and 
stated (page 115), 
"We conclude, therefore, that the Search \Var-
rant should not have been issued because the 
Affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a 
finding of probable cause, and that the evidence 
obtained as a result of the Search \Varrant was 
inadmissable in Petitioner's trial." 
In U.S. vs. Menser, 247 F. Supp., 826 (1965), a 
Habeas Corpus proceeding by a state prisoner, the 
Cuited States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut, decided (page 831), 
"The Affidavit here is fundamentally no more 
than the bare statement that the police received 
information from a reliable source that pool 
selling was being carried on at petitioners' prem-
ises. It nowhere discloses how the informant came 
to his stated conclusion. On what facts was it 
based? Did he actually see the pool selling being 
carried on or the "paraphernalia"? Did he hear 
it from another unmentioned source, or is his 
statement based on mere suspicion? "What the 
police say does not necessarily carry the day; 
'probable caue' is in the keeping of the magis-
trate" ... If, rather than the proper official, 
it is the police or, as in this case and in .Aguilar, 
15 
even an unidentified third party who deci!b 
whether the facts known to him are a sufficient 
indication that probable cause exists for the issu-
ance of a warrant, the amendment would br re 
duced "to a nullity and leave the people's houses 
secure only in the discretion of police officers." 
and continuing on page 832: 
"No matter how closely and how liberally the 
Affidavit is scrutinized, there is no "common 
sense" way, nor any other way, of importing into 
the informant's statement an answer to what hi.1 
conclusion was based upon - and that is whal 
Aguilar requires to be before the magistrate." 
The Court thereupon ruled that (page 833) the ad-
mission of that evidence violated the Defendant's con-
stitutional rights and issued the Writ of Haheas 
Corpus. 
In the case of Benjamin Zesck vs. The People a.I: 
the State of Colorado, 409 P2d 522, the Colorado Court 
in two short paragraphs reversed a conviction, stating 
"The Search Warrant was obtained upon an 
Affidavit based upon the testimony of a police· 
man whose only source of information was a 
telephone call to the police department by 3 
person who refused to give his name. Such an 
Affidavit does not meet the constitutional re· 
quirement set forth in Hernandez and Agnilar. ,, 
supra. 
In this case the Attorney General confessed that tbe 
trial court erred in admitting into evidence the fruit' 
of a search under a 'Varrant constitutionally invalid 
As stated by Justice Goldberg in United State' 
vs. Ventresca, supra., page 691: 
16 
"This court is alert to invalidate unconstitu-
tional searches and seizures whether with or 
without a warra1it ... By doing so it vindicates 
individual liberties and strengthens the admin-
istration of justice by promoting respect for law 
and order." 
CONCLUSION 
In order that a Search 'V" arrant be valid, the 
Constitutional and Statutory requirements must be met 
at the time of issuance. The trial court does not have 
the power to change these requirements or authorize 
au attempted compliance some two months after the 
Search "r arrant was issued. A Search Warrant issued 
in violation of the constitutional and statutory mandates 
is void and a search thereunder unreasonable and un-
lawful. The fruits of such a search is inadmissible as 
evideuce. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress should 
have been granted and as the Defendant's conviction 
is based entirely upon evidence that should not have 
been admitted, the conviction should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD 0. HYDE 
505 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
2640 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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